{"ObjectType":101,"Sequence":7407,"PreHash":"FE32FB7D32F1F015733468564F986939","Content":"\r\n\r\n# 是美国叫嚣要在台湾海峡使用核武器，而不是中国大陆\r\n\r\n[ 底线思维 ](javascript:void\\(0\\);)\r\n\r\n__ _ _ _ _\r\n\r\n以下文章来源于北京对话Beijing Club ，作者周波\r\n\r\n\r\n**北京对话Beijing Club** . 北京对话 Beijing Club for International Dialogue 智库 信息发布平台\r\n\r\n编者按：今年7月，中国发布《中国关于互不首先使用核武器倡议的工作文件》，再次呼吁“核武器国家采取不首先使用核武器政策，或者宣布互不首先使用核武器”，推动世界和平进程。\r\n\r\n近日，清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员、中央军委国际军事合作办公室安全合作中心前主任周波应帕格沃什科学和世界事务会议（Pugwash Conferences\r\non Science and World\r\nAffairs）邀请，就“中国与核裁军”进行线上专题讲座，就“不首先使用核武器”政策的内在逻辑以及具体的可执行措施进行了论述。\r\n\r\n帕格沃什科学和世界事务会议是一个由著名学者和公共人物的国际组织，旨在减少武装冲突带来的危险，寻求解决全球安全威胁的途径。1955年《罗素—爱因斯坦宣言》发布，1957年，该组织成立，创建人为约瑟夫·罗特布拉特（Joseph\r\nRotblat）和伯特兰·罗素，创立地点为加拿大帕格沃什。罗特布拉特与帕格沃什科学和世界事务会议因在核裁军上的努力而获得了1995年诺贝尔和平奖。\r\n\r\n观察者网和北京对话受权翻译、发布讲座全文如下：\r\n\r\n【翻译/李泽西 核译/韩桦】\r\n\r\n**周波**\r\n：谢谢彼得·詹金斯大使。今天能与各位帕格沃什成员交流我深感荣幸。我要特别感谢我在剑桥大学圣·埃德蒙学院就读期间的院长布莱恩·希普爵士在感染新冠的情况下在线出席。\r\n\r\n今天我将讨论一些与核武器和中国有关的议题。首先，我们是否已经进入了一个新的核时代？让我引用周恩来总理接受法国记者采访时的回答。当时记者问，“如何看待法国大革命”？据说他的答复是，“现在下结论为时太早”。\r\n\r\n那么，我们是否已经进入了一个新的核时代？答案亦是如此。但如果一些核武国家，比如美国，重新开始核试验——前美国国家安全顾问奥布莱恩等个别美国人鼓励特朗普，如果再次当选，就开展核试验——那么其他国家肯定会效仿。到那时，我们可以肯定地说，核试爆的震撼将标志着新的核时代开启。\r\n\r\n让我先来谈谈欧洲爆发核战争的可能性以及中国对此的立场。\r\n\r\n美国中央情报局分析认为，乌克兰发生核战争的概率为50%。虽然我们不确定未来会如何发展，但根据CSIS（美国战略与国际研究中心）的统计，俄罗斯领导层在讨论乌克兰冲突时已经有200次提到使用核武器。关键问题是，俄罗斯的相关说法有几分认真？\r\n\r\n日前，普京总统下令修改了核政策，基本上是降低了核武器的使用门槛：只要俄罗斯和白俄罗斯遭受常规武器攻击，且这种攻击对主权构成重大威胁，即可使用核武器。但何为“重大威胁”并没有明确的定义，这就引发了新的问题：什么样的情况才算是重大威胁？\r\n\r\n我个人认为，相对而言，俄罗斯在某些情况下更有可能动用核武器，比如说，如果他们面临失去克里米亚的威胁。但是在当前局势下，这种可能性并不大。\r\n\r\n另一种情况是俄罗斯失去已经在宪法上宣布为其领土的四个（乌克兰）东南部地区，当然各方对于他们是否能够完全掌控这四个地区，仍存在着不同看法。\r\n\r\n我认为最准确的回答是，没人知道战争如何结束。我曾经与一位乌克兰大使交谈，她说了一句话让我印象深刻。我问她，战争会持续多久？她回答道：“我们的孙辈们会继续战斗。”我不知道这是否会成真，但那是她的原话。\r\n\r\n因此，这是第二种可能性。但还有第三种可能性可能最为现实，那就是，当红线看似不再存在时，局势最为危险。我指的是，在美国的支持下，装备西方武装的乌克兰，正一点点渗入俄罗斯境内战斗。尽管这是战争初期的红线，但这条红线似乎不复存在了。\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n当地时间2022年2月24日，普京总统宣布，俄罗斯武装部队将开展一项特别军事行动。图为当日克里米亚的俄罗斯军用卡车驶近乌克兰边境。视觉中国\r\n\r\n接下来我们看看北约扩张的情况。我与许多西方人士交流过，他们不认为北约扩张是俄罗斯决定与乌克兰发生冲突的主要原因，但我坚信这是其中的关键。实际上，俄罗斯的警告并不始于普京总统，这可以追溯到苏联时期。从戈尔巴乔夫到叶利钦再到普京，俄方领导都曾发出类似的警告。\r\n\r\n那普京与前任有什么不同呢？我认为他是那个决定不再容忍的人。乌克兰的最终结局会如何？目前下结论还为时尚早，但我认为最有可能的结果是类似于朝鲜半岛的停战协议。不过，这种停战协议可能会更加脆弱，因为其中一方是世界上核武储备最多的五常之一。\r\n\r\n我能猜测俄罗斯未来会如何行动，他们会利用核模糊政策，或者可能在未来几十年发出更加严厉的核威胁。为什么会这样呢？原因很简单，因为俄罗斯的常规军力较之于冷战时期已经大幅削弱。1982年他们曾宣布不首先使用核武器，1993年放弃了这一承诺，因为苏联解体后，俄罗斯的常规实力已不如从前。\r\n\r\n那么，中国的情况如何呢？首先，我想谈一下中国与俄罗斯的关系，它被称为“无上限伙伴关系”，这引起了整个西方世界的担忧。\r\n\r\n但对我来说，这种“无上限伙伴关系”仅仅是中国希望与其最大邻国建立友谊的一种自然描述方式。试想一下，如果我说我想与你建立友谊，但随即声明，我们的友谊必须有限度，你会怎么想？让我再给你一个例子。当我们与巴基斯坦人交谈时，他们常会说中巴友谊比喜马拉雅山还高，比阿拉伯海还深，比蜜糖还甜。你会怎么做？你可能会微笑，也许还会点头，因为你知道他们并没有恶意。\r\n\r\n第二点是，中国并不是北约所称的“俄罗斯的决定性支持者”。我知道西方对中国出口许多可能具有军民两用的商品不满。但对于两用产品，我们首先必须假设这些产品先是民用的，而非军用的。就像汽油和天然气，没人会把它们视为军用产品。然而，如果将汽油加注到军用卡车上，它们就可能转变为军用产品。因此当某物被认为是军民两用时，我们应该首先假设它是民用的。\r\n\r\n中国确实加大了对俄罗斯的出口，部分原因是受到制裁的俄罗斯希望从其他地区增加进口，部分原因是中国的经济增速不如从前，中国当然希望增加出口。但这些出口并没有违反任何国际条约。\r\n\r\n关于俄罗斯使用核武器的问题，我认为中国无论是普通民众还是领导层的态度都很明确。我曾在英国《金融时报》上发表过一篇文章，最后写道：总统先生，不要使用核武器！我知道中俄之间关系友好，但我也清楚，中国几十年以来一直坚定不移的政策是“不首先使用核武器，不对无核国家和地区使用核武器”。\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n当地时间2024年3月18日，联合国安理会就核裁军和防扩散问题举行公开会。中方代表表示，中国不参加任何形式的核军备竞赛，并呼吁国际社会合力推进核裁军与核不扩散进程。\r\n\r\n2022年11月，习近平主席对访华的德国总理朔尔茨表示，在欧洲不能使用核武器。朔尔茨的访华受到了某些人的批评，但他回国后表示，单是为了达成这个（不使用核武器）共识，他的访华也是值得的。\r\n\r\n接下来，我想说一下2022年联合国五个常任理事国在俄乌冲突之前发布的联合声明。这是一个源于冷战时期的老口号：核战争打不赢，也打不得。但最有意义的是，当习近平主席2023年3月访问俄罗斯时，在战争期间，中俄再次发表了包含这一句话的联合声明。\r\n\r\n我认为，中国一直在努力劝说俄罗斯不要使用核武器。否则怎么会有这样的联合声明呢？因此，这意味着中国确实在努力为欧洲的和平与稳定做出积极贡献。我们不知道俄罗斯是否会使用核武器。但我认为，中国、印度和巴西的态度对俄罗斯而言是有分量的，我也希望这些国家的观点能发挥作用。\r\n\r\n所以我认为，目前普京总统可能是俄罗斯领导层中最理智的人，因为他在被俄罗斯学者卡拉加诺夫问及俄罗斯是否应该使用核武器时，否认了这种可能性。\r\n\r\n接下来，我想谈谈中国的核现代化。据报道，中国目前拥有500枚核弹头，而根据五角大楼的说法，中国计划在2035年之前将这一数量增加到1500枚。在中国，没有人会确认这个数字，因为它被视为机密。\r\n\r\n不过，即便这个数字是真的，中国的核武库仍然远远小于美国和俄罗斯，两国的核弹头数量均超过5000枚。对中国而言，增加核武器数量无论是从技术上还是经济上都简单，因为中国掌握了相关技术，并且是全球最强大的工业国。中国的经济规模也至少是俄罗斯的十倍。\r\n\r\n那么，是什么阻止中国拥有更多核弹头呢？我认为，主要原因在于中国不想卷入核军备竞赛，而这也在中国的国防预算中得到了很好的体现。为什么这么说呢？因为在国际关系中，有两样东西是不会骗人的。首先，地理不会说谎。你的行动会受到地理环境的极大限制，比如在朝鲜半岛。\r\n\r\n人们常常讨论朝鲜可能发起核攻击，但我们也要考虑到，朝鲜半岛的整个长度仅为1200公里。既然任何核辐射显然会遗留在朝鲜半岛，那么究竟在什么情况下，朝鲜领导层会发动自杀性的核攻击呢？其次，国防预算也不会说谎。无论你是否增加国防预算，这都会充分反映出一个国家对地缘环境、自我能力、对手或敌人能力的评估。\r\n\r\n中国的国防预算在过去四十年里一直保持在2%以下。实际上，大多数时候，中国国防预算甚至只有GDP的1.5%左右或更低。这充分反映出中国的自信心，表明中国对自身、地区乃至中美关系的信心。中国的信心至关重要，因为如果中国缺乏这种信心，或者像印度和日本那样急剧增加国防预算，那么整个亚太地区将会陷入混乱。\r\n\r\n接下来，我想解释一下中国“把自身核力量维持在国家安全需要的最低水平”的含义。这在几份中国的国防白皮书中都有提到。最低水平究竟是多低呢？我个人的理解，要确保的是，即便中国宣布了不首先使用核武器，其他核武器国家也不敢对中国发动先发制人核打击。这就要求中国具备足够的威慑力量。\r\n\r\n众所周知，最近中国向南太平洋发射了洲际弹道导弹。这意味着什么？虽然中国媒体没有透露太多细节，但我相信这增强了中国人民对其军队的信心，也展示了中国的军事能力。此外，这表明中国必须对其武装力量进行现代化建设。我认为现代化不仅仅意味着提高新的能力，还包括合理增加武器数量。否则，如果数量没有变化，那实际上只是在进行维护。\r\n\r\n中国的发射活动已提前通知美国，而美国对此表示了肯定。这让我不禁思考：将来美国是否也会通知中国其核活动或洲际弹道导弹发射情况？毕竟，中美两国已经签署了关于重大军事活动的互通协议。那么，什么算是重大军事活动？当然，中国的洲际弹道导弹发射是其中之一。那么，美国会不会提前通知中国其在南海的行动？或者说，是否会通知中国有关舰船将通过台湾海峡的情况？\r\n\r\n接下来，我想讨论台湾海峡发生核战争的可能性。中国政府依然在强调和平统一。甚至美国国防部长奥斯汀在香格里拉对话会上也表示，战争既不是迫在眉睫，也不是不可避免的，我对此感到高兴，因为这直接否认了美国一些将军关于中国将在2025年或2027年攻台的说法。毕竟，奥斯汀的言论应该是基于权威的信息和情报做出的。\r\n\r\n我们不可能对台湾人民使用核武器，这几乎是不可想象的。但是，有一些美国人，比如前国防部部长帮办柯伯吉，以及一些智库，如大西洋理事会，鼓吹美国在台湾海峡首先使用核武器的问题，原因在于他们认为美国在常规战争中正逐渐处于劣势。我对此的看法是，我们必须让美国放弃这个荒谬的想法。\r\n\r\n为此，我认为我们应该增加一些核武器，这样，在一场美国不敢对中国首先使用核武器的常规战争中，我们能取得胜利。\r\n\r\n接下来，有两个关于中国核政策的常见误解。第一个是，中国不愿意谈论核裁军。你可能听说过很多相关说法。但我认为，这实际上取决于你想与中国讨论什么。为何不讨论中国提出的“不首先使用核武器”的政策？中国会非常乐意谈论这个问题。\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n当地时间2024年9月15日，俄罗斯符拉迪沃斯托克，俄罗斯海军“潘捷列耶夫海军上将”号驱逐舰(右)参加了在日本海举行的俄罗斯太平洋舰队和中国人民解放军海军军舰参加的“大洋-2024”战略指挥和参谋海军演习。视觉中国\r\n\r\n然而，如果你想借此窥视中国核现代化或发展的速度和规模，可能会感到失望。因为中美如果要讨论核裁军，两国需要大致势均力敌，因此要么中国需要大幅增加核武器库存，要么美国需要大幅减少其核库存，这两者都不太可能。第二个误解则是美国最近提出的、最荒谬的《核部署指南》。报道称，美军可能需要为俄罗斯、中国和朝鲜的“协作核对抗”做好准备。\r\n\r\n我的问题是，中国、俄罗斯和朝鲜何时协调过使用核武器？我几乎无法想起中国和朝鲜军队何时有过联合演习，遑论可能涉及核武器方面的合作？这种想法太疯狂了。基于这种荒谬的分析来制定战略简直是毫无理性而言。\r\n\r\n接下来，我想谈谈我对中美战略稳定的看法。冷战期间的战略稳定主要是指核武器之间的均衡，但我认为在中美之间，我们可以实现一种更广泛的战略稳定，这不仅包括核弹头的数量，还可以涵盖新兴领域，例如网络、人工智能和太空。\r\n\r\n我相信中美可以在这三个领域进行对话，因为双方在这些领域的差距并不大。我在《外交事务》上发表的文章中提到，在网络安全领域，我们应该交换一份敏感目标清单，确保在任何情况下都不攻击这些目标。在人工智能领域，我们应确保绝对的人类控制，尤其是在核指挥和控制系统上。在外太空，我们应探讨禁止在太空部署武器的可能性，正如中国和俄罗斯所提议的那样。同时，我们也可以讨论西方提出的规则和负责任行为的问题。\r\n\r\n接下来，我想最后阐述为什么我认为中国提出的“不首先使用核武器”政策是所有核武器国家都可以接受的。这是我最近在《外交政策》杂志上发表过的观点。首先，在讨论核裁军时，有两个前提条件。第一，近期内禁止核武器是不可能的。我知道在2017年，非核武器国家提出了禁止核武器的条约，但没有任何核武器国家会希望现在就禁止核武器。\r\n\r\n因此，这一点是不可行的。再者，在竞争日益激烈的情况下，核武器国家也不可能希望减少自己核武器的储备。正如我刚才提到的，中国也可能需要合理地增加核弹头数量。然而，我相信在这两个前提下，“不首先使用”看起来是降低核威胁的最现实的方法。\r\n\r\n逻辑非常简单：即使你承诺不首先使用，它也不会削弱你的还击能力，同时你将站上道德高地。另一个原因是，经过一些研究，我发现美国、英国和法国的核政策，实际上与中国的“不首先使用”政策并没有太大的差距。接下来让我逐个阐述这些国家的情况。\r\n\r\n例如，美国最近的核政策有所变化，但直到2022年，美国核态势评估表示只会考虑在极端情况下使用核武器，以捍卫美国及其盟友和伙伴的重大利益。\r\n\r\n令我困惑的是一个关键字：“重大利益”。我无法想象，美国的什么利益或盟友的什么利益会要求美国首先使用核武器。美国不是已经首先使用过核武器吗？有哪些利益对美国如此重要，以至于美国需要首先使用核武器，尤其考虑到美国拥有最强大的常规军队和数量众多的核弹头？我知道美国的盟友对此感到担忧，他们希望美国提供核保护伞。但让我回到之前提到的例子，我们来谈谈朝鲜。\r\n\r\n朝鲜时不时会发出威胁，但他们真的发动核攻击的可能性有多大呢？任何一方在朝鲜半岛使用核武器都是自杀行为，因为会留下放射性尘埃。因此，正确的问题是，在什么情况下，朝鲜会决定自杀？答案是，除非他们相信自己再也无法生存，希望与敌人同归于尽。若考虑朝鲜领导层的这一动机，我们就不必担心他们会首先使用核武器来攻击他国。\r\n\r\n英国的核政策与美国非常相似，因为英国也只会在自卫的极端情况下考虑使用核武器。法国则承诺遵循“够用即可”原则。综上所述，我得出的结论是，这些国家的核政策实际上与中国的核政策并没有太大差别。\r\n\r\n最大的挑战是如何让俄罗斯参与其中。实际上，我认为俄罗斯的“先升级后降级”战略在乌克兰冲突中是有效的，因为到目前为止，美国依然对乌克兰使用其提供的武器设定了一些限制。\r\n\r\n那么，俄罗斯如何才能放弃当前做法，承诺不首先使用核武器呢？因为这种战略存在一种困境，因为“先升级后降级”的策略取决于他人对威胁的感受与担忧。关键在于，如果人们感受到威胁，他们可能会感到恐惧。然而，如果你真的使用核武器，你就无法控制对手的报复规模，这种以牙还牙的风险可能演变为无人希望发生的全面核战争。对俄罗斯来说，这可能会导致北约的介入，这是莫斯科最担心的事情。\r\n\r\n因此我个人建议一种双轨制。首先，在欧洲方面，我建议北约采取两个步骤。第一步，北约可以对俄罗斯单方面作出不首先使用核武器的承诺，做出一种善意的姿态。北约真的想要对俄罗斯首先使用核武器吗？绝对不敢。所以，他们可以做出这样的承诺。通过这一善意的姿态，可以缓解紧张局势。\r\n\r\n第二步可能对北约来说有点难以接受，但仍是可以实施的。北约可以承诺停止进一步扩张，以换取俄罗斯采纳不首先使用核武器的政策。北约可能会问：如果其他国家希望加入，我们为什么要拒绝扩张？我的观点是，俄罗斯的行为至少有北约扩张的因素，虽然这并不是全部原因，但确实是原因之一，因为俄罗斯领导人对此反复提及。\r\n\r\n从另一个现实的角度来看，目前只有三个国家在等待加入北约：波黑、格鲁吉亚和乌克兰。这三国与俄罗斯的关系都较为复杂。因为希望加入北约，格鲁吉亚已经经历过一场战争，而乌克兰正处于战争中。因此，即使这三个国家加入北约，带来的麻烦也多于好处。而且实际上没有太多国家在等待加入北约。因此，我认为这在北约的可接受范围内。\r\n\r\n至于亚洲，因为中国和俄罗斯关系友好，两国已就不首先使用核武器达成共识。如果中国和美国也能达成类似协议，将有助于减少与包括美国盟友在内的潜在冲突。\r\n\r\n因此关键在于，中国和美国是否能够达成类似的协议。有人可能会觉得我过于天真，居然相信美国会同意这样的姿态。但我并不认为这是异想天开，我们可以从历史中得到启示。1998年，印度和巴基斯坦进行了核试验。没过多久，中国和美国迅速达成了一项罕见的协议，展现了两个核大国之间的团结，即停止将彼此的核武器瞄准对方。两年后，联合国五个常任理事国于2000年都达成了核武器互不瞄准协议。\r\n\r\n这一协议的重要性在于，它传递了核武器国家对世界核裁军的善意信号。虽然意义有限，但至少它是有象征意义的。然而，“互不瞄准”的问题是无法进行核查。你怎么能知道我是否在瞄准俄罗斯或美国呢？但我相信，不首先使用核武器自然是该协议的下一步骤。想想看，如果核武器互不瞄准了，下一步是什么？当然是不首先使用。我不认为不首先使用核武器只是口头承诺。有些人可能会说，中国倡导不首先使用核武器只是一种外交伎俩。\r\n\r\n那么，我想夸张点说，为什么我们不都采用这个“外交伎俩”呢？这将形成一种道德约束。互不瞄准无法核查，但是要是你首先使用了核武器，人人都看得到！不首先使用核武器的承诺对全世界有益。最后，既然所有五常国家都同意“核战争打不赢”，那么我们为什么不能承诺不首先使用核武器呢？我就说到这里。如果有任何问题我会尽力回答。谢谢。\r\n\r\n**问答环节**\r\n\r\n**听众一** ：我强烈同意“不首先使用核武器”确实是逻辑上的下一步。但我怀疑美国是否愿意参与这一逐步推进的进程。\r\n\r\n在欧洲，公众舆论在乌克兰问题上似乎更倾向于支持通过谈判结束战争，而政治领导人却朝着相反方向行动。\r\n\r\n让我举一个例子。最近欧洲议会通过了一项决议，我引用一下，它呼吁“以一切可能的方式支持乌克兰取得胜利”。在我看来，这是以一种可怕的方式去呼吁持续战争。\r\n\r\n您认为美国利益是否驱动其持续乌克兰战争？我认为美国的立场有两个原因。一是为了阻止中国、欧洲和俄罗斯之间形成集团，因为从长远来看，这个集团可能比美国强大得多。\r\n\r\n同时，出于同样的目的，美国还试图破坏德国与俄罗斯之间的关系，并挑起俄罗斯与中国之间的不良关系。\r\n\r\n**周波** ：谢谢，我知道既有人同意，也有人反对你的观点。\r\n\r\n例如，《纽约时报》的专栏作家保罗・克鲁格曼认为，支持乌克兰不会花费太多，但也有其他人持相反的观点。我认为目前美国很难找到解决方案，因为它实际上卷入了两场战争。美国认为中国是“步步紧逼的威胁”，所以他们想重点聚焦中国。这两场仗无疑会分散他们的注意力。\r\n\r\n所以我不认为他们希望战争继续下去，但正如我之前所说，没有人知道如何结束这场战争。\r\n\r\n帕格沃什驻日内瓦主任巴萨诺夫：这是一场极其有趣的辩论。我长期支持“不首先使用核武器”的原则，我明白在实现这个想法的道路上存在许多困难。就在奥巴马离开白宫前的最后几个月，他曾试图以此改变美国的政策。人们普遍认为他失败了，因为美国的盟国反对这一想法。\r\n\r\n现在，我的分析是美国军方安排美国一些最亲密的盟国反对奥巴马的上述努力。\r\n\r\n我认为我们需要考虑各种因素，包括新的因素，以便在不首先使用核武器方面取得进展，解决更多问题，奠定坚实或更可靠的基础，包括你提到的中美之间战略稳定的重要因素，即人工智能、太空等领域。\r\n\r\n我强烈认为，新的领域、新的能力或非核武器、非核力量正在成为一个越来越需要解决的重要因素。\r\n\r\n有一点我需要纠正，俄罗斯关于在乌克兰使用核武器的辩论是一种错误的描述。基本上除了一些白痴，包括领导层的白痴以外，没有人提及在乌克兰使用核武器。问题是如何阻止北约的直接介入。我认为我们需要推进\r\n“不首先使用核武器”\r\n的理念。我们需要开始认真讨论这些想法如何运作，通过二轨外交开始。令人遗憾的是，一轨外交存在很大的障碍。我不是说不可能实现突破，但确实存在障碍，并且有必要明确利益、关切、目标、步骤、障碍等等。谢谢。\r\n\r\n**周波** ：谢谢你的长篇评论。因为你没有提出问题，所以我就不回应了。\r\n\r\n**主持人**\r\n：非常感谢。来自蒂莫西・赖特的两个问题。“不首先使用核武器”条约是否包括签署国在军力态势方面的改变？例如，各国继续保持接到警告就发射态势；核战争仍可能因这种误算或意外而发生。所以问题是，你是否认为有（不首先使用的）政治声明就足够了？其次，中国说它不会参与核军备竞赛，却在增加核武器平台和运载工具的数量。所以他认为所有迹象都表明中国将继续扩大其能力，那么这与中国的立场相符吗？\r\n\r\n**周波**\r\n：好的，让我先回答第二个问题。首先，我认为中国增加核武器数量（如果真的发生的话）幅度不会很大，因此这不应该被视为核军备竞赛。是的，拥有更多核武器，正如我所说，这也意味着中国需要使其核力量现代化，因为中国希望使其所有军种现代化，而火箭军也是其中之一。\r\n\r\n现在让我来回答第一个问题。如果所有国家都承诺不首先使用核武器，实际上，你将自己置于全世界人民的监督之下，人们会看你是否真的能遵守承诺。如果所有有核国家都说我不会首先使用，那么这将能鼓舞无核国家。想想看，核武器国家，尤其是美国这样一个最强大的国家，为什么需要首先使用核武器?\r\n\r\n如果一群弱小贫穷的国家之间结盟以自保，我可以理解。但如果是世界上最强大的国家之间结盟，那么我就无法理解。如果你是最强大的国家，人们知道攻击你的后果，因为你有足够的报复能力。那么为什么你不能承诺不首先使用核武器呢？这不会降低你的报复能力。这就是我的观点。\r\n\r\n我也知道现在各国要采纳不首先使用核武器的政策实际上有多困难。但我相信，一旦政治条件成熟，就可能会有合适的时候。2000年我们同意核武器互不瞄准对方之前，美国也有人说，这怎么可能现实呢？我们考虑的是对方的能力，而不是意图，因为意图一夜之间就能改变。但是，印巴核试验为核大国提供了一个机会，核大国必须表现出团结，必须表明反对核试验，因为这种反对的立场符合《不扩散核武器条约》。\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n不扩散核武器条约。Wikipedia\r\n\r\n**主持人**\r\n：我们还有一些问题。安德鲁的问题是，如果一个恐怖组织开发出核武器并威胁到任何一个世界大国，会发生什么？“不首先使用”政策在这种情况下会如何发挥作用？大卫问道，为了实现“不首先使用”\r\n政策，你认为中国可以或应该向美国在东亚的盟友提供哪些保证？\r\n\r\n**周波**\r\n：关于恐怖分子的问题。第一个问题是，他们有核武器吗？或者他们会首先使用核武器吗？如果他们首先使用核武器，你进行报复是完全合理的，对吧？但是真正的问题在于，你如何用核武器报复一群很容易隐藏在某个难以被探测到的地方的恐怖分子呢？\r\n\r\n让我们谈谈东亚与中国。在任何情况下，中国会对任何国家首先发动核攻击吗？中国宣称对南海的很大一部分拥有主权，但到目前为止，中国根本没有对东南亚的任何国家发出过使用武力的威胁。中国甚至正在与东盟谈判南海行为准则。同样道理，为什么中国会想用核武器攻击无核的日本呢？你很难举出一个例子来说明中国有对东亚任何国家使用核武器的意图。\r\n\r\n我给出的唯一例子是关于朝鲜，我认为，即使朝鲜不时地用疯狂言论发出威胁。但实际上，任何核武器的发射，即使是小型战术核弹，都是自杀行为，因为朝鲜半岛太小了。尽管有这样的言辞，但除非他们想自杀，否则他们很难做出这个决定。唯一的问题是他们为什么想自杀呢？答案是除非他们认为自己无法再生存下去，他们想与你同归于尽。\r\n\r\n**听众二** ：谢谢。您能评论一下你们和朝鲜之间的关系吗？\r\n\r\n**周波**\r\n：各方就朝鲜领导人是否理性有很多争论。但是如果你看看过去20年发生的事情，我认为可以说朝鲜走边缘政策很成功，对吧？走边缘政策需要大量的算计，这不是一件容易做到的事情，就像是在走钢丝。所以我认为朝鲜领导人是理性的。\r\n\r\n**听众三** ：谢谢。我担心的是，在涉及台湾的冲突中，冲突压力是否会超过使用核武器的界限，以致我们仍然可能面临核战，特别考虑到非战略核武器。\r\n\r\n**周波** ：中国有具备核能力的中程导弹。这是事实。但中国仍然承诺不首先向任何国家使用核武器。\r\n\r\n我们把台湾人民称为同胞。我们怎么会对我们称为“台湾同胞”的人民使用核武器呢？所以这是完全不可想象的。我不相信会有这样的情景，但危险的是我刚才所说的。一些美国人，比如前国防部部长帮办以及一些智库公开叫嚣要美国在台湾海峡使用核武器。\r\n\r\n现在，你可以很容易地在网上搜索到这些信息。从历史上看，美国人曾谈论过对中国使用核武器。所以在这一点上我必须进行比较：当西方谈论俄罗斯时，他们害怕俄罗斯会使用核武器；但当他们谈论中国时，似乎他们并不害怕中国较小规模的核武库。相反，他们谈论对中国人首先使用核武器。所以对中国人来说，简单的逻辑是我们必须增加我们的核武库。对我们来说，正如我之前提到的，这只需要一个政治决定。所以我想说，中国作为世界上最强大的工业国家，西方国家真的应该为中国到现在为止如此克制而庆幸。\r\n\r\n**听众四**\r\n：如果我们确实同意了一项全球不首先使用核武器政策，或者甚至是中美之间的双边不首先使用核武器政策，那会怎么样呢？在所有核国家都同意一项不首先使用核武器政策之后，你认为下一步应该采取什么措施来进一步推进呢？\r\n\r\n其次，如何对无核国家提供消极安全保证？不首先使用核武器在其中起到什么作用呢？\r\n\r\n**周波**\r\n：尽管我提出了这个建议，认为隧道尽头有一线希望，但是希望之光很微弱，并不明亮。是的，对我们来说做到这一点很困难，尽管我相信这是正确的事情，并且对所有有核国家来说都是可行的。\r\n\r\n之后，我认为我们必须讨论前进的道路，因为全面核裁军是人类的目标。\r\n\r\n让我再给你举个例子。我刚刚简要提到了我们在外太空的竞争。中国和俄罗斯表示不在外太空部署任何武器。我认为这很有意义。我们在地球上不是已经有足够多的武器了吗？为什么还要在轨道上放置武器呢？还有什么人类的愚蠢行为比在太空放置武器来攻击自己的星球、自己的家园更严重呢？\r\n\r\n但是美国和西方国家认为不在轨道上部署任何武器是不可能的。但我仍然相信不部署武器是可能的，因为迄今西方国家也没有把他们部署在太空的东西描述为武器。\r\n\r\n如果普通大众认为我们在外太空没有任何武器，那么气氛将会轻松得多。中国和俄罗斯的提议是基于《月球条约》的，这是从《月球条约》向前迈出的一步，该条约禁止在月球上部署任何武器。如果你们不在月球上部署任何武器，那又为什么要在轨道上的任何地方部署武器呢？如果不是因为美国对绝对霸权的渴望，它又为何要这么做呢？\r\n\r\n**听众五**\r\n：我觉得中国的邻居们担心的不仅仅是中国的核武器，更是中国巨大的经济实力、庞大的军队，以及我认为的一种扩张主义态度，比如想要控制南海。或许这阻止了美国宣布不首先使用核武器的政策，因为它们想保留阻止或遏制中国的权利，比如说，防止中国扩张并占领美国盟友的领土。你怎么看？\r\n\r\n**周波**\r\n：首先，对包括我在内的任何一个中国人来说，中国经济的蓬勃发展确实是一件好事。中国的军事力量确实在不断增长，这是毫无疑问的。但如果你谈到南海问题，中国并没有阻碍任何在南海的自由航行船只。每年有大约十万艘船在南海通行。你可曾听到过这些船只中有任何一艘抱怨中国阻碍了航行自由吗？是的，中国与一些东盟国家存在领土争端，但人们忘记一件事。这些声索国之间本身也存在重叠的声索。所以问题不仅仅存在于中国和东盟国家之间，问题在于中国看起来比这些国家要大得多。大让人觉得敬畏，小让人觉得可爱。人们喜欢小的东西，包括小黄瓜、小番茄。这是人类的本能，而不是理性。这是我能给出的唯一原因。\r\n\r\n以下为英文全文：\r\n\r\nZhou Bo：Thank you，Ambassador Peter Jenkins. This is indeed a great honor for\r\nme to talk to distinguished Pugwash members. I'm especially grateful that my\r\nmaster of St Edmund’s College Sir Brian Heap is also present，particularly\r\nbecause he actually is suffering from COVID.\r\n\r\nToday，I'm going to talk on a few aspects that are nuclear and China-related.\r\nThe first question is，are we already in another nuclear age? Let me quote what\r\nlate Premier Zhou Enlai said when he was asked by a French journalist，“what do\r\nyou think of the French revolution?” His answer was reportedly“ it is too\r\nearly to tell”. Then，have we entered into a new cold war? Again，probably it is\r\nalso too early to tell. But if we would have nuclear weapon states like United\r\nStates to kick off nuclear tests，as suggested by a number of\r\nAmericans，including former American national security adviser Robert\r\nO’brien，who encouraged Trump to conduct a nuclear test should he become\r\nreelected，I am very much sure it will be followed by others. Then we\r\ndefinitely can say the big bangs of nuclear test herald the dawn of another\r\nnuclear age.\r\n\r\nLet me first talk about the possibility of a nuclear war in Europe and China’s\r\nposition. According to CIA’s estimate，the chance of a nuclear war in Ukraine\r\nis at 50 %. We don't know exactly what might happen， but according to\r\nCSIS，there are over 200 cases of Russian leadership referring to use of\r\nnuclear weapon in the context of the war in Ukraine. The question is，how\r\nserious are Russians? What we are seeing is that a few days ago，President\r\nPutin has ordered change of nuclear doctrine. Basically，that means lowering\r\nthe threshold. The nuclear weapons might be used in response to an attack on\r\nRussia and Belarus using conventional weapons，if the attack poses a crucial\r\nthreat to sovereignty. This kind of description about crucial threat to\r\nsovereignty actually is ambiguous，because then comes the question- What is\r\ncrucial threat?\r\n\r\nI personally believe there are a few situations in which Russia might be more\r\nlikely to use nuclear weapons. One is，if they might lose Crimea，which is not\r\nquite possible in the current circumstance.\r\n\r\nAnd then if they lose the four Southeastern regions that are already declared\r\nto be Russian territory under Russia’s constitution. Of course，there is a huge\r\ndebate as to whether they could have full control of the four regions or not.\r\n\r\nI believe the right answer is，nobody knows how the endgame looks like. Once I\r\nhad a conversation with a Ukrainian ambassador who said something that really\r\nimpressed me. I asked how long will the war last? She said “our grandchildren\r\nwill continue to fight”. I don't know whether that is true or not，but that is\r\nwhat she said. So this is the second possibility，but the last one probably\r\nlooks most real. That is when a red line no longer looks like a red line. I\r\nbelieve that is the time when the situation is most dangerous. I'm referring\r\nto Ukraine fighting deeper and deeper into the Russian territory using the\r\nweapons provided by the West. If that is the red line in the beginning，it no\r\nlonger looks like a red line.\r\n\r\nThen let's look at what has happened about the NATO expansion. I have talked\r\nto many people in the West. They don't believe that NATO’s expansion is the\r\nvery reason that Russia decided to have a conflict with Ukraine，but I believe\r\nit is. In fact，warnings from Russia do not start from President Putin. It came\r\nfrom the Soviet time. It came from Mikhail Gorbachev down to Boris Yeltsin to\r\nPresident Putin. And what makes Putin different? He's the man who said enough\r\nis enough. So how the endgame in Ukraine would look like? It's too early to\r\ntell，but I assume the biggest possibility is a kind of armistice，very much\r\nlike that in the Korean peninsula. But this armistice would be more volatile\r\nbecause one party is one of the P-5 countries with the largest nuclear\r\nstockpile in the world.\r\n\r\nI assume I know what Russia is going to do -- play with kind of a nuclear\r\nambiguity，or make very serious nuclear threats in decades to come. Why is\r\nthat? The reason is very simple. Because Russia's conventional force has\r\ndeclined tremendously compared to the cold war era. Unlike in 1982 when they\r\nactually announced no first-use on nuclear weapons，in 1993，they dropped this\r\npledge because after the dissolution of Soviet Union，Russia is no longer as\r\nstrong as before in conventional forces.\r\n\r\nThen，what about China? First of all，I need to say something about China's\r\nfriendship with Russia，which，described as “unlimited partnership”， alarms the\r\nwhole West.\r\n\r\nBut for me，this kind of unlimited partnership is just a natural description of\r\nChina’s good wish to develop friendship with its largest neighbor. Just think\r\nof this: If I say I want to develop my friendship with you，but then I say，hang\r\non for a moment，this friendship has to be limited. What do you think? Let me\r\ngive you another example. When we talk to Pakistanis，Pakistanis would often\r\nsay China-Pakistan friendship is higher than the Himalayan mountain，deeper\r\nthan the Arabian sea，and sweeter than honey. What would you do? You would\r\nsmile，and probably nod your head，because you know that they mean no harm.\r\n\r\nThe second thing is，China is not a “decisive enabler of Russia” as NATO\r\ndescribed. I know the West is not happy with China exporting a lot of items\r\nthat might be dual use in nature. But when something is dual use in\r\nnature，first，we have to assume it is a civilian item rather than a military\r\nproduct. Just like oil and gas. Nobody considers oil and gas military\r\nproducts. But if it is put into the tank of a military truck，it could\r\nimmediately become a military product. Therefore，when something is dual-use in\r\nnature，we have to assume it is for civilian use first.\r\n\r\nChina has indeed exported more things to Russia，partly because Russia being\r\nsanctioned needs more import from elsewhere，and partly because China of course\r\nwants to export more because Chinese economic growth has slowed down. But none\r\nof these exports is violating any international treaties. On Russia using\r\nnuclear weapons，I think in China，all people from ordinary Chinese people to\r\nChinese leadership，the attitude is quite clear. I myself has written an\r\nopinion that was published in Financial Times ending with a sentence: don't\r\nuse nuclear weapons，Mr. President. I know the good relationship between China\r\nand Russia，but I also know it is a decades-old firm Chinese policy of not\r\nusing nuclear weapons first，and not use nuclear weapons against nuclear weapon\r\nfree countries and zones.\r\n\r\nIn November 2022，President Xi told visiting German chancellor Olaf Scholz no\r\nuse of nuclear weapons in Europe. Olaf Scholz’s visit to China was criticized\r\nby some people. He went back and said even for this consensus，his visit to\r\nChina was worthwhile.\r\n\r\nThen I need to say something about P-5 joint statement in 2022 before Russia's\r\nwar in Ukraine. This is an old slogan coming from the cold war \\-- nuclear war\r\ncannot be won and must never be fought. But what is most interesting is that\r\nwhen President Xi Jinping visited Russia in March，2023 amid the war， again we\r\nhad a joint statement between China and Russia in which this slogan was\r\nrepeated. I think China has been trying its best in telling Russia not to use\r\nnuclear weapons. Otherwise，how could we have this joint statement? That means\r\nChina is really trying hard to make its due contribution towards peace and\r\nstability in Europe. We don't know whether Russia will use nukes or not. But I\r\nthink the attitude of China，India，and Brazil matters for Russia. And I hope it\r\nmatters.\r\n\r\nSo I believe right now，President Putin probably is the most rational person in\r\nthe Russian leadership，because he denied the possibility of using nuclear\r\nweapons when he was asked by Karaganov whether Russia should use it or not，he\r\nsaid no.\r\n\r\nNow let me talk about China’s nuclear modernization. Reportedly，China has 500\r\nnuclear warheads. And it has an ambition to increase this nuclear arsenal to\r\n1,500 by 2035 according to the Pentagon. No one in China will confirm this\r\nnumber because this is considered a secret in China. But even if this is true，\r\nChina’s nuclear arsenal is apparently still much smaller than that of the\r\nUnited States and Russia. Both of them have more than 5,000 nuclear warheads.\r\nFor China to increase its nuclear arsenal，technically and economically，it is\r\nsimple. China has technical know-how and China is the strongest industrial\r\nnation on earth. China’s economy is at least 10 times larger than Russia.\r\n\r\nSo what is impeding China from having more nuclear warheads? I believe that is\r\nbecause China believes it should not enter into a nuclear arms race. China’s\r\ndefense budget tells more than anything about this. Why? Because I believe in\r\ninternational relations，there are two things that won't lie. Geography would\r\nnot lie，because your operations would be very much constrained by\r\ngeography，such as in Korean peninsula. People have been talking about how DPRK\r\nmight launch a nuclear attack，but think of Korean peninsula，which is just 1200\r\nkilometers in length. Given the nuclear radioactive dust that will surely\r\nlinger on the peninsular，the question is in what kind of situation would the\r\nNorth Korean leader decide to launch a nuclear attack that is surely suicidal?\r\nThen，defense budget would not lie，because defense budget，whether you increase\r\nit or not，will tell your real assessment about the environment，about your\r\nself-confidence and about your adversaries or enemies.\r\n\r\nChina’s defense budget has been under 2 % for four decades. Basically，most of\r\nthe time，it's around or even lower than 1.5 % of its GDP. This tells a lot\r\nabout China. It tells China is confident about itself. It tells China is\r\nconfident about the region. And it even tells China is confident about the\r\nChina-U.S. relationship. China's confidence certainly matters，because if China\r\nis not confident，if it drastically increases defense budget like India and\r\nJapan，then the whole Asia-Pacific would be chaotic.\r\n\r\nThen，let me try to explain what does “keeping the nuclear capabilities at the\r\nminimum level required for national security” mean. This is quoted in several\r\nChinese defense white paper. What is the minimum level? My personal\r\nunderstanding is，no nuclear weapon states dare to launch a preemptive nuclear\r\nstrike on China in spite of China’s no-first use of nuclear weapons. This in\r\nturn requires China to have adequate strength of deterrence.\r\n\r\nEverybody knows that recently，China launched ICBM into the Southern Pacific.\r\nWhat does this mean? The Chinese press release didn't tell much，but I believe\r\nit is a boost of Chinese people's confidence in its own military. It is also a\r\ndemonstration of China’s military capability. It also demonstrates that China\r\nwould have to modernize its armed forces. I think modernization means new\r\ncapabilities and reasonably increased quantity. If you just keep the same\r\nnumber，then you are just doing a maintenance job. China’s launch has been\r\nnotified to the United States. The United States has expressed appreciation\r\nfor this. This invited a question: would the United States also notify China\r\nabout its nuclear activities or about its ICBM launches one day? Especially\r\nbecause China and the United States have actually signed agreement on mutual\r\nnotification of major military activities. Then what are major military\r\nactivities? Of course，China's launch of ICBM is one of them. What about the\r\nUnited States? Would you notify China what you are going to do in the South\r\nChina sea? Or when your ships are going to sail through Taiwan Strait?\r\n\r\nPerhaps it will be surprising for you to know that I am going to talk about\r\nthe possibility of a nuclear war in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese government\r\nstill talks about peaceful unification. Even the American secretary of defense\r\nLloyd Austin said at Shangri-La Dialogue a war is not imminent or inevitable.\r\nI'm happy he talked about this，because this is a direct denial of quite a few\r\nallegations from some American generals and admirals that China is about to\r\nattack Taiwan in 2025 or 2027，so on and so forth，because Austin should have\r\ntalked with authority based on briefings，information and intelligence.\r\n\r\nWe certainly would not use nuclear weapons against our own people in Taiwan.\r\nThis can hardly be imagined for any Chinese. But the question is，there are\r\nsome Americans like former deputy assistant secretary Elbridge Colby，or some\r\nthink tanks like Atlantic Council talking about United States using nuclear\r\nweapons first in Taiwan Strait，because they believe the US military is\r\nbecoming inferior to the PLA in terms of conventional warfare. My answer is\r\nthat we have to let the United States give up this crazy idea. And for that to\r\nhappen，I think we have to increase some nuclear weapons so we can prevail in a\r\nconventional war against the United States in which the United States dare not\r\nuse nuclear weapons against China first.\r\n\r\nThere are two myths on China’s nuclear policy. One is that China doesn't want\r\ntalks on nuclear disarmament. You should have heard a lot about this. But my\r\nargument is that it really depends on what you want to talk to China. How\r\nabout talking about Chinese proposal -- no first-use of nuclear weapons? China\r\nis more than willing to talk about this. But if you want to talk to China to\r\nfind out the speed and scale of China’s nuclear modernization or\r\ndevelopment，probably you would become disappointed. Because for China and the\r\nUS to talk about nuclear disarmament，there has to be a parity--either China\r\nhas to drastically increases its nuclear stockpile，or the United States has to\r\ndrastically decrease its nuclear stockpile to reach an equilibrium. None of\r\nthem looks possible. The second myth is something most recent and most\r\nridiculous，the so-called “nuclear employment guidance” of the United States.\r\nIt is reported that the U.S. has to prepare for coordinated nuclear\r\nconfrontation with China，Russia and North Korea simultaneously.\r\n\r\nMy question is，when have China，Russia and North Korea coordinated their\r\nnuclear weapons? I can hardly remember when China had a joint exercise with\r\nthe North Korean military. How come we have coordinated our nuclear weapons?\r\nThis is totally insane. People making a strategy based upon such insane\r\nanalysis is crazy.\r\n\r\nThen let me talk about what I believe is China-U.S. strategic stability.\r\nStrategic stability during the cold war refers to the equilibrium in nuclear\r\nweapons，but I believe between China and the U.S.，we can actually have a kind\r\nof strategic stability，not only on the number of warheads，but also including\r\nsome new areas，that is cyber，AI and outer space.\r\n\r\nI believe China and the US can afford to talk to each other in these three\r\nareas just because the gaps between the two sides are not so big in these\r\nareas. As I have proposed in my article in “Foreign Affairs”，in cyber，we\r\nshould exchange a list of sensitive targets between China and U.S. that should\r\nnot be attacked in any circumstances; In AI，we should make sure absolute human\r\ncontrol over the command & control，especially the nuclear command & control\r\nsystem; and in outer space，we should discuss no-placement of weapons in outer\r\nspace，as China and Russia have proposed. At the same time，we can also discuss\r\nwhat the West has proposed: to talk about rules and responsible behaviors.\r\n\r\nNow let me come to the final part of what I am going to say-- Why I consider\r\nno-first use of nuclear weapons China proposed is affordable for all nuclear\r\nweapons states. This is what I have written recently in “Foreign Policy”\r\nmagazine. Because I believe，first of all，there are two preconditions for us to\r\ntalk about nuclear disarmament. First，it is impossible to ban nuclear weapons\r\nanytime soon. I know there is a treaty about prohibition of nuclear weapons in\r\n2017 by non-nuclear weapons states. But none of the nuclear weapon states\r\nwould wish to ban nuclear weapons now.\r\n\r\nSo it is impossible. Again，what is equally impossible is that the nuclear\r\nweapon states would wish to reduce their nuclear stockpiles amid ever\r\nintensifying competition. As I’ve just said， probably China would also have to\r\nreasonably increase its nuclear stockpile. But I believe with these two as\r\npreconditions，no first-use looks like the most realistic approach in reducing\r\nnuclear threats. Why is that? Simply put，it would not reduce your capabilities\r\nfor retaliation，even if you promise no-first use. At the same time，you would\r\nenjoy moral high ground. Another reason is，I believe，after some studies，that\r\nAmerican，British，and French nuclear policies actually are not so far away from\r\nChina’s no first use. Let me come to each one of these countries.\r\n\r\nFor example，American’s recent nuclear policy has changed a bit，but until\r\n2022，for example，in its nuclear posture review，it said that it would only\r\nconsider the use of nuclear weapons in the extreme circumstances to defend the\r\nvital interests of the United States and its allies and partners. What\r\nconfused me is the key word，“vital interests”. I just cannot imagine what kind\r\nof vital interests or interests of allies would require United States to use\r\nnuclear weapons first. Didn't the United States already use nuclear weapons\r\nfirst? What kind of interests are so important for United States that，having\r\nthe strongest conventional forces and also one of the largest numbers of\r\nnuclear warheads，the US still would have to use nuclear weapons first? I know\r\nAmerican allies are concerned. They want the United States to provide nuclear\r\numbrella. But let me come back to the example，which I mentioned before.\r\n\r\nLet's talk about the DPRK. DPRK would make threats from time to time.\r\n\r\nBut how likely would it be for them to really launch a nuclear attack? Because\r\nany use of nuclear weapons would be suicidal given the radioactive dust that\r\nwould be lingering over Korean peninsula. So the right question is，in what\r\nkind of circumstances would DPRK decide to commit suicide? The answer is\r\nunless they believe they can no longer live，so they want to die with you. If\r\nwe believe in the rationality of the DPRK leadership，then we do not need to\r\nworry about their first use of nuclear weapons.\r\n\r\nThe nuclear policy of UK is very much similar to that of the United\r\nStates，because UK also talks about using nuclear weapons only in extreme\r\ncircumstances of self-defense. And when we come to France，France has pledged\r\nto hold to a principle of strict sufficiency. This is why I have concluded\r\nthat the nuclear policies of these countries actually are not that far away\r\nfrom China’s.\r\n\r\nThe biggest challenge is how to get Russia in. Actually，I would say Russia’s\r\nstrategy to “escalate to deescalate” has worked in the war in Ukraine，because\r\nso far，the United States has still put some limits on what Ukraine can do with\r\nweapons that it has supplied. So how can Russia give it up to pledge no-first\r\nuse? Because there is a dilemma of this strategy，because this strategy to\r\n“escalate to deescalate” depends on threats and fear of threats by other\r\npeople. The point is，if people are threatened，they might become afraid. But if\r\nyou really use nukes， you cannot control the scale of the retaliation by your\r\nadversaries，a tit-for-tat risks of becoming a full blown nuclear war that\r\nnobody wants. For Russia，it might just invite the involvement of NATO，the very\r\nthing that Moscow fears most if Russia really uses nuclear weapons.\r\n\r\nThis is why I suggest a kind of a dual track approach，my personal suggestion.\r\nIn Europe，I suggest two steps for NATO. The first step is that NATO makes a\r\nunilateral no-first use pledge against Russia as a gesture of goodwill. Does\r\nNATO want to use nuclear weapons first against Russia? Never. So you can\r\nafford to make a unilateral no first use pledge. Because with this\r\ngesture，tensions can start to thaw.\r\n\r\nThen the second step is a little bit bitter for NATO to swallow，but still\r\naffordable. That is NATO pledges to halt any further expansion of the alliance\r\nin exchange for Moscow to adopt no first use policy. NATO would say，why should\r\nI stop expansion when other countries want to join? My argument is that at\r\nleast NATO’s expansion so far has a role in Russia’s response if it is not the\r\nwhole reason because Russian leaders keep talking about it.\r\n\r\nFrom another realistic point of view，right now there are only three countries\r\non the waiting list to join NATO. That is Bosnia and Herzegovina，Georgia，and\r\nUkraine. All these three countries have some troubled relationship with\r\nRussia，because they want to join NATO. Georgia and Ukraine，one had a war with\r\nRussia，another one is having a war with Russia. So these three countries’\r\nentry into NATO would bring more trouble than benefit. Since there aren't\r\nother countries waiting to join，I believe it is affordable for NATO.\r\n\r\nAnd then in Asia，China and Russia have already agreed to no first use against\r\neach other，apparently，because of the good relationship. But if China and the\r\nUnited States could reach a similar agreement，then it would deescalate a lot\r\nof potential conflicts involving American allies.\r\n\r\nSo the crucial point is whether China and the United States could reach a\r\nsimilar agreement. People might consider I am too naïve to believe that the\r\nUnited States would do that. But I don’t think I’m naive if I give you a\r\nlesson from history. India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Very\r\nsoon，China and the United States came to something which was so rare，that is，\r\nthey quickly agreed to show solidarity between two nuclear powers，that is，to\r\nde-target their nuclear weapons at each other. In two years’ time，all the P5\r\ncountries have agreed on non-targeting in 2000.\r\n\r\nThe strong point of this agreement is that it is a good sign of the goodwill\r\nof the nuclear weapons states towards world nuclear disarmament. Even if non-\r\ntargeting is not that significant，at least it's symbolic. The problem of non-\r\ntargeting is it is not verifiable. How do you know if I’m targeting Russia or\r\nthe United States or not? But I believe no first use is the natural step\r\nforward. Listen to this，non-targeting of nuclear weapons，what is the next\r\nstep? Of course no-first use of nuclear weapons. I don't think no first use of\r\nnuclear weapons is lip service. Some people say China’s promotion of no first\r\nuse is a kind of diplomatic ploy.\r\n\r\nBut then let me exaggerate to say，how about all of us join this “diplomatic\r\npoly”? Because this would become morally binding. Non-targeting is not\r\nverifiable，but no-first use is verifiable if you use nukes! No first use is\r\ngood for the whole world. Finally，since all P-5 countries have agreed that a\r\nnuclear war cannot be won，why can't we pledge no-first use? Let me stop here\r\nand try my best to answer some of your questions. Thank you.\r\n\r\nComments: I agree very strongly no first use is a sort of logical step\r\nforward. But I doubt the United States will be willing to go along with this\r\nstep by step process for the following reason.\r\n\r\nIt's already becoming clear in Europe. In my opinion，a public opinion is\r\nmoving in favor of supporting negotiations to end the war whilst European\r\npolitical leaders are moving in the opposite direction.\r\n\r\nJust to give one example，if I may. It was the European parliament resolution\r\nrecently，which was passed，which called for，and I'm gonna quote， “support in\r\nevery way possible for Ukraine's victory”. That's a sort of horrible blood\r\ncurdling cry for a continuation of war，in my opinion.\r\n\r\nSo do you think the United States has an interest in maintaining the war in\r\nUkraine. And I think that would be for two reasons. One is to prevent a bloc\r\nbetween China，Europe and Russia， which would make it considerably stronger\r\nthan the United States，that's in the longer term.\r\n\r\nAnd also，for that same end to foster bad relations between Germany and Russia\r\nand to encourage bad relations between Russia and China.\r\n\r\nZhou Bo:Thank you. I do understand that there are two kinds of people in\r\nsupporting or opposing your views.\r\n\r\nFor example，Paul Krugerman，columnist of The New York Times，has actually said\r\nthat supporting Ukraine would not cost much，but there are other people arguing\r\nthe other way around. I believe right now，the United States is really\r\nstruggling to find a solution，because it is actually involved in two wars. It\r\nbelieves that China is a “ pacing threat”，so they want to be focused on China.\r\nThese two wars would definitely distract its attention.\r\n\r\nSo I don't think they want the war to continue，but as I said before，nobody\r\nknows how to end this war.\r\n\r\nSergey Batsanov( director of Pugwash，Geneva): It's an extremely interesting\r\ndebate which has just started. I am a long-time enthusiast of no first use\r\nobjective. I understand that there are many difficulties on the way to this\r\nidea. Obama tried to change the US policy from this particular aspect，just in\r\nthe several last months before his departure from the White House. The common\r\nstory is that he failed because the US allies objected to that.\r\n\r\nNow，my analysis was even before that happened，that it was US military who\r\narranged rejection of this Obama’s idea by the closest or some of the closest\r\nallies.\r\n\r\nI think that we need to take into account a variety of factors，including new\r\nfactors in order to prepare a solid or a more reliable base for making\r\nprogress for no first use，including what you mentioned，when you discussed\r\nelements，important elements of strategic stability or sharing strategic\r\nstability between China and the US -- artificial intelligence，space and so on.\r\n\r\nI would very strongly note that the new functions，new capabilities，or non-\r\nnuclear models，non nuclear forces，are becoming stronger and stronger factors\r\nthat need to be addressed.\r\n\r\nNow，one thing I need to correct. The debate in Russia about using nuclear\r\nweapons in Ukraine is a wrong description. Nobody is talking about using\r\nnuclear weapons in Ukraine，basically， except for some idiots，also high-level\r\nidiots. The question is about how to deter direct NATO involvement. To sum\r\neverything up，I think we need to move forward with the no first use; the idea\r\nI want to move，we need to start discussing seriously those ideas --how they\r\nwork，starting with Track-II process，because Track-I has important limitations.\r\nI'm not saying it's impossible，but you have the limitations. And there is a\r\nneed to clarify interests，preoccupations，objectives，steps，obstacles，and so on\r\nso forth. Thank you.\r\n\r\nZhou Bo:Thank you for your long comment. Since there are no questions，I wish\r\nnot to respond.\r\n\r\nComments: Thanks very much. I've got two questions from Timothy Wright. He\r\nasked will a proposed no first use treaty encompasses change to a signatory’s\r\nrespective force posture. If countries continue to have a launch on warning\r\nposture，for instance，nuclear war can still happen through miscalculation or\r\naccident. So he's asking if you think that political statement is\r\nsufficient，and secondly，China says it won't enter a nuclear arms race but it\r\nis expanding the number of the platforms and delivery vehicles. So he's\r\narguing that all the signs are that China will continue to expand its\r\ncapacities，and how does this align with Beijing’s position?\r\n\r\nZhou Bo: Let me come to the second question first. I think China's increase of\r\nnuclear weapons，if it really happens，would not be on a huge margin，therefore\r\nit would not be considered a nuclear arms race. Having more nuclear\r\nweapons，this is what I said，also means that China needs to modernize its\r\nnuclear forces because China would like to modernize all its military\r\nservices，Rocket Force is also one of them. Now let me come to the first\r\nquestion. If all countries promise no first use，actually，you put yourself in\r\nthe hands of the people around the world. People will see if you really honor\r\nyour promise or not. If all nuclear weapons states say I won’t be the first to\r\nuse，then this is a consensus that would be encouraging for non-nuclear weapons\r\nstates. Just think of this，why should we need to use nuclear weapons\r\nfirst，especially for the United States which is the strongest nation on earth?\r\n\r\nIf an alliance is among a group of small，poor countries for self-defence，I\r\nunderstand it. But if this kind of alliance is among the strongest nations on\r\nearth，then I do not understand. If you are the strongest nation，people know\r\nthe consequence if they attack you，you certainly have more than enough\r\ncapabilities in retaliation. So why can't you promise no-first-use because it\r\nwould not reduce your capabilities in retaliation. I know how difficult it is\r\nactually now for countries to adopt no first use. But I believe there could be\r\na moment when political conditions are ripe. When we talk about non-targeting\r\nof nuclear weapons before 2000，there was also a voice in the United States\r\nwhich said，how can this be realistic? What I'm thinking about you is about\r\nyour capability，not your gesture. But the Indo-Pakistan nuclear tests provide\r\nsuch a chance that the nuclear powers have to show a kind of solidarity. And\r\nnuclear powers have to show their opposition because their opposition is in\r\nline with NPT.\r\n\r\nComments: We have a few more questions. So one from Andrew，what would happen\r\nif a terrorist organization developed a nuclear weapon and threatened any of\r\nthe world powers? How would no first use policy work then? David asks what\r\nassurances do you think China could or should give to US allies in East Asia\r\nabout its intentions?\r\n\r\nZhou Bo：Well，about terrorists. First of all，do they have nuclear weapons? Or\r\nwould they will use nuclear weapons first? Because if they use nuclear weapon\r\nfirst，if you retaliate，you are fully entitled to retaliate，right? So the\r\ngenuine question actually is，how could you retaliate with nuclear weapons\r\nagainst a group of terrorists who could easily hide themselves somewhere? That\r\nis difficult to detect.\r\n\r\nLet's talk about East Asia. Let's talk about China. Why in any circumstances\r\nwould China launch a nuclear attack first on any countries? China claims large\r\npart of South China Sea，but so far， China has made no threats of using force\r\nat all toward any country in Southeast Asia. China is even negotiating a South\r\nChina Sea code of conduct with ASEAN. Likewise，why would China want to use\r\nnuclear weapons against Japan which has no nuclear weapons? You can hardly\r\ngive an example to say China has intention to use nuclear weapons against any\r\ncountry in East Asia.\r\n\r\nThe only example I gave just now is about DPRK which would make crazy remarks\r\nfrom time to time. But in reality，any launch of nuclear weapons，even small\r\ntactical nuclear bombs，is suicidal because the Korean Peninsula is too small.\r\nThey，in spite of rhetoric，can hardly make this decision unless they want to\r\ncommit suicide with someone. Then the question is why would they want to\r\ncommit suicide? The answer is: unless they believe they could no longer\r\nlive，so they want to die with you.\r\n\r\nComments: Thank you. Can you have a general comment on the relations between\r\nyou and North Korea.\r\n\r\nZhou Bo：You see，there are so many debates about whether the North Korean\r\nleadership is rational or not. But if you look at what happened in the last 20\r\nyears，I think it is correct to say they have walked so fine on brinksmanship.\r\nRight? Brinksmanship requires a lot of the calculations，a lot of rationality-\r\nnot something easily to be done，this is walking on a tight rope. So I would\r\nassume the leadership of DPRK is rational.\r\n\r\nComments: Thank you. I'm concerned，in a conflict over Taiwan，whether the\r\nconflict pressure would exceed this threshold，and we could still have nuclear\r\nwar，and specifically in the context of non strategic nuclear weapons.\r\n\r\nZhou Bo：In China，there are some intermediate range missiles that are nuclear\r\ncapable. That is true. But still，China has promised not to use nuclear weapons\r\nfirst against anyone.\r\n\r\nWe describe Taiwan people as our own compatriots. How can you imagine that we\r\nwould use nuclear weapons against people whom we call “our compatriots in\r\nTaiwan”? It's totally unimaginable. I don't believe there is such a\r\nscenario，but what is dangerous is what I said just now. Some Americans\r\nincluding a former deputy assistant secretary of defense，and some think tanks\r\nopenly ask the United States to use nuclear weapons in Taiwan Strait.\r\n\r\nNow you can just google that very easily. Historically，they（ in the US）talked\r\nabout using nuclear weapons against China. So I have to compare: when the West\r\ntalked about Russia， they're just afraid Russia would use nuclear weapons. But\r\nwhen they talk about China，it seems that they are not afraid of China's\r\nsmaller nuclear arsenal. Instead，they talk about using nukes first against the\r\nChinese. So the simple logic for Chinese is that we have to increase our\r\nnuclear arsenal. And for us，as I mentioned before，it's just a political\r\ndecision. Right? We are economically strong. We have technical know-how. We\r\nare the strongest industrial nation on earth. So I would say that the western\r\ncountries should really congratulate themselves for China being so restraint\r\nuntil now.\r\n\r\nComments: let’s assume we did agree on a global no first use policy or even\r\none bilaterally between the US and China. What do you see as the next step to\r\nbuild on that after a no first use policy has been agreed by all nuclear\r\nstates?\r\n\r\nSecondly，what about negative security assurances for non-nuclear weapons\r\nstates? How does that play into this?\r\n\r\nIn spite of my proposal，I believe this is really the light at the end of the\r\ntunnel. It is dim light，it is not bright light. Yeah，it's difficult for us to\r\ndo it，although I believe it is the right thing to do，and it is affordable for\r\nall nuclear weapon states.\r\n\r\nThen I believe we have to discuss about the ways forward because in NPT，total\r\nnuclear disarmament is the goal of mankind.\r\n\r\nLet me give you another example. I just briefly mentioned about our\r\ncompetition in outer space. China and Russia said no placement of any weapons\r\nin outer space. I think this makes a lot of sense. Don't we already have\r\nenough weapons on earth? Why should you place weapons in orbits? And which\r\nhuman folly is more monumental than places something in outer space to strike\r\nback on earth，our planet，our only homeland? But the United States and western\r\ncountries just believe it is impossible not to place weapons in orbits.\r\n\r\nThey believe we can deploy them，but we need to discuss about responsible\r\nbehaviors. But I still believe no placement of weapons in space is\r\npossible，because no West countries so far have described what they have\r\ndeployed in space as a weapon.\r\n\r\nSo it would be much more relaxed if ordinary people think we do not have any\r\nweapons in outer space，because China and Russia's proposal comes from the Moon\r\nTreaty，but it is a step forward from Moon Treaty，which prohibits any placement\r\nof weapons in moon. If you don't place any weapons in moon，why would you place\r\nany weapon anywhere in orbit? If it is not for America’s desire for absolute\r\nsupremacy，what is impeding Americans from doing so?\r\n\r\nComments: It strikes me that what worries China's neighbors is not so much its\r\nnuclear weapons，but its huge economic power. It's massive army，and it's what I\r\nwould say is a kind of expansionist attitude in wanting to take over the South\r\nChina Sea. It prevents the US from declaring no first use policy. Because it\r\nwants to preserve the right to prevent or deter China， say，from taking over\r\nthe US allies. How do you feel about that?\r\n\r\nZhou Bo:First，I think it’s really a good thing for Chinese economy to become\r\nbooming，for any Chinese like me. China's military is really growing. That is\r\nno doubt. But if you talk about the South China Sea，China is not impeding with\r\nany ships’ freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. There are 100,000\r\nships transiting through the South China Sea every year. Have you ever heard\r\nany complaint from the ships that China is impeding freedom of navigation?\r\nYes，China has some territorial disputes with some ASEAN countries，but people\r\nforget one thing. These claimants have overlapping claims themselves. So it's\r\nnot only between China and ASEAN countries. The problem is that China looks\r\nmuch bigger than these countries. Big is beautiful and small is adorable.\r\nPeople love things small，including baby cucumber，baby tomato. That is human\r\ninstinct，not rationality. That is the only reason I can give.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n预览时标签不可点\r\n\r\n微信扫一扫 \r\n关注该公众号\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n****\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n****\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n× 分析\r\n\r\n： ， ， ， ， ， ， ， ， ， ， ， ， 。 视频 小程序 赞 ，轻点两下取消赞 在看 ，轻点两下取消在看\r\n分享 留言 收藏\r\n\r\n","Timestamp":1730476800000,"PublicKey":"025BB998F9094380ADAEE18FE09936970A0D80EB4AC0A750302305B6362D0F656B","Signature":"3045022100AF3F2D04FDAADD07508447D373AAA4D84A2B825F56917C627F2AD93809413F6D02203E3B199FE39AFD85A17FB4F536BABCBB231B8AD74885E4EE8C8BA2F68FD69C94"}