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# 纽约时报说中俄朝要搞核联盟？我就问一个问题
原创 周波 [ 底线思维 ](javascript:void\(0\);)
__ _ _ _ _
> 编者按：清华大学战略与安全中心研究员周波在South China Morning Post(《南华早报》)上发文回应New York
> Times（《纽约时报》）有关拜登批准美国核部署机密文件的报道。周波表示，足够的核威慑力量和绝对的核反击能力，是中国倡导“不首先使用核武器“的前提条件。
>
> 此前，周波在美国Foreign Policy(《外交政策》)杂志发文，论述五个正式核大国都应该承诺“不首先使用核武器”。
【文/ 观察者网专栏作者 周波，翻译/ 李泽西 核译/ 韩桦】
这可真新鲜：据《纽约时报》报道，美国总统拜登于今年3月批准了一份名为《核部署指南》（Nuclear Employment
Guidance）的机密文件。知情人士称，文件中阐述的战略强调，美军可能需要为俄罗斯、中国和朝鲜的“协作核对抗”做好准备。
我的首要问题是：都没有中俄朝联盟，哪来的核联盟？中俄关系虽密切，但北京并未在俄乌冲突期间向其提供任何直接军事援助，这表明中俄关系并非联盟性质。
与此同时，尽管北京与平壤之间数十年前签订了条约（编者注：中朝友好合作互助条约），要求在战时相互提供军事援助，但如今，中国与朝鲜的军事互动可能比中国与大多数非洲国家的军事互动还要少。那么，这三个国家如何协调所谓针对美国的核战略或核行动呢？
相较俄罗斯，美国在核武器上没有明显优势，未来也不会有，因为俄罗斯拥有更多的核弹头。苏联解体后，俄罗斯的常规力量急剧下降。正因为如此，俄罗斯现在比以往任何时候都更加依赖核武器。
这就解释了为什么俄罗斯在乌克兰战争期间数次发出使用核武器的隐晦威胁，并将在未来几十年继续实施“核模糊”策略。
“和平卫士”导弹弹头。Atomic Archive
此外，如果世界上所有核大国都提高核力量的战备状态，就会增加像冷战时期“虚警”事件的可能性。在早期的远程雷达时代，即使是升起的月亮也可能被误认为是导弹袭击。鉴此，随着更多核武器国家进入高度戒备状态，很可能会出现更多“虚警”或重大事故。
拜登政府的核战略令人遗憾，尤其是因为他在自己政治生涯的大部分时间都在倡导核不扩散。自二战以来，我们已经有大约80年没有发生过全球大国之间的重大战争。
如果这算是一种安慰，那么在冷战结束后约30年，我们会再次陷入冷战的可能性，又令人不安。我只能祭出牛顿的这句话：“我能计算星辰的运行，却无法计算人类的疯狂"。
（以下为英文全文）
This really is an eye-opener. According to The New York Times, US President
Joe Biden approved a classified document in March called the “Nuclear
Employment Guidance”. Sources familiar with the situation say that the
strategy laid out in the document emphasises the need for US forces to prepare
for possible coordinated nuclear confrontations with Russia, China and North
Korea.
My first question is this: where is a China-Russia-North Korea alliance, let
alone nuclear alliance? China-Russia relations are close, but Beijing not
having provided any direct military assistance to Moscow in its invasion of
Ukraine suggests their relationship is not an alliance.
Meanwhile, in spite of a decades-old treaty between Beijing and Pyongyang that
calls for mutual military assistance in time of war, China’s military
interactions nowadays with North Korea are perhaps fewer than its interactions
with most African countries. So how could the three countries coordinate these
nuclear strategies or operations against the United States?
The US has no clear advantage in terms of nuclear weapons over Russia, which
has more warheads, and it won’t in the future. Precisely because its
conventional forces have drastically declined since the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, Russia now relies more than ever on nuclear weapons.
This explains why Moscow has made several thinly veiled threats of using
nuclear weapons during its war in Ukraine and will continue to play with
nuclear ambiguity in the decades to come.
China’s nuclear capabilities, including the number of nuclear warheads, are
considered state secrets. Therefore, it is unlikely that anyone in China will
publicly confirm the accuracy of the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute’s estimates. The think tank released a report in June indicating
China’s nuclear arsenal had increased from 410 warheads in January 2023 to 500
this January and that for the first time China could be deploying a small
number of warheads on missiles during peacetime.
In a 2019 defence white paper, China said it would “keep its nuclear
capabilities at the minimum level required for national security”. Evidently
this “minimum level” cannot be quantified because national security needs vary
in different times and environments.
Even if China’s nuclear arsenal has grown to 500 warheads and could grow as
large as 1,500 by 2035, according to Pentagon estimates, Beijing can still
argue that it is still much smaller than Russia’s roughly 6,000 warheads and
the 5,400 of the US. At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had more
than 40,000 nuclear warheads while the US had more than 23,000 – enough to
destroy the whole planet. Why would China choose to become involved in such
madness?
In my understanding, “minimum level” refers to a threshold that no other
nuclear power would dare to cross with a pre-emptive nuclear strike on China,
even if China maintains a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons.
Precisely because of this policy, China has to build adequate strength for
deterrence. It requires China to have sufficient nuclear warheads to resist an
enemy’s first strike and ensure China has second-strike capability.
With such nuclear capabilities, China’s military could have a better chance of
emerging victorious over the US in the event of a conventional war, such as
one in the Taiwan Strait. Given that the gap between the conventional military
forces of China and the US is already closing, China having a large enough
nuclear arsenal would force the US to give up any ideas of using nuclear
weapons first.
China call for a “no first use” policy might look to some people like wishful
thinking at a time when nuclear weapons seem to be growing in importance amid
the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza, but it isn’t. Nuclear weapons are not an
omnipotent force, and having them is no guarantee of success in a conflict. If
China, the US, Russia, Britain and France can all agree that a nuclear war
cannot be won and therefore should never be fought, then why can’t they commit
to their own “no first use” policy?
Much has been written about whether the world has entered a new cold war. If
the US really is poised to resume conducting nuclear tests, as some reports
suggest, this would be tantamount to an official announcement of a new cold
war.
The sight of renewed US nuclear testing would almost certainly usher in tests
by other nuclear powers, spelling doom for nuclear non-proliferation efforts.
This would likely swell the number of states with nuclear weapons beyond the
current nine, resulting in a considerable reduction in the conventional force
superiority of the US and its allies.
Furthermore, if all the world’s nuclear powers increase the readiness of their
nuclear forces, it could increase the chances of false alarms, like those seen
during the Cold War. During the early days of long-range radar, even a rising
moon could be misinterpreted as a missile attack. One can easily conclude that
with more nuclear weapons states on high alert, there could be more false
alarms or significant incidents.
The Biden administration’s nuclear strategy is a shame, not least because the
president spent so much of his political career advocating for nuclear non-
proliferation. We have had no significant wars between global powers for some
80 years since World War II.
If this is a solace, it is also disturbing to think we might enter into
another cold war some 30 years after the first. I can only concur with these
words attributed to Isaac Newton: “I can calculate the movement of the stars,
but not the madness of men.”
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# 纽约时报说中俄朝要搞核联盟？我就问一个问题
原创 周波 [ 底线思维 ](javascript:void\(0\);)
__ _ _ _ _
> 编者按：清华大学战略与安全中心研究员周波在South China Morning Post(《南华早报》)上发文回应New York
> Times（《纽约时报》）有关拜登批准美国核部署机密文件的报道。周波表示，足够的核威慑力量和绝对的核反击能力，是中国倡导“不首先使用核武器“的前提条件。
>
> 此前，周波在美国Foreign Policy(《外交政策》)杂志发文，论述五个正式核大国都应该承诺“不首先使用核武器”。
【文/ 观察者网专栏作者 周波，翻译/ 李泽西 核译/ 韩桦】
这可真新鲜：据《纽约时报》报道，美国总统拜登于今年3月批准了一份名为《核部署指南》（Nuclear Employment
Guidance）的机密文件。知情人士称，文件中阐述的战略强调，美军可能需要为俄罗斯、中国和朝鲜的“协作核对抗”做好准备。
我的首要问题是：都没有中俄朝联盟，哪来的核联盟？中俄关系虽密切，但北京并未在俄乌冲突期间向其提供任何直接军事援助，这表明中俄关系并非联盟性质。
与此同时，尽管北京与平壤之间数十年前签订了条约（编者注：中朝友好合作互助条约），要求在战时相互提供军事援助，但如今，中国与朝鲜的军事互动可能比中国与大多数非洲国家的军事互动还要少。那么，这三个国家如何协调所谓针对美国的核战略或核行动呢？
相较俄罗斯，美国在核武器上没有明显优势，未来也不会有，因为俄罗斯拥有更多的核弹头。苏联解体后，俄罗斯的常规力量急剧下降。正因为如此，俄罗斯现在比以往任何时候都更加依赖核武器。
这就解释了为什么俄罗斯在乌克兰战争期间数次发出使用核武器的隐晦威胁，并将在未来几十年继续实施“核模糊”策略。
“和平卫士”导弹弹头。Atomic Archive
此外，如果世界上所有核大国都提高核力量的战备状态，就会增加像冷战时期“虚警”事件的可能性。在早期的远程雷达时代，即使是升起的月亮也可能被误认为是导弹袭击。鉴此，随着更多核武器国家进入高度戒备状态，很可能会出现更多“虚警”或重大事故。
拜登政府的核战略令人遗憾，尤其是因为他在自己政治生涯的大部分时间都在倡导核不扩散。自二战以来，我们已经有大约80年没有发生过全球大国之间的重大战争。
如果这算是一种安慰，那么在冷战结束后约30年，我们会再次陷入冷战的可能性，又令人不安。我只能祭出牛顿的这句话：“我能计算星辰的运行，却无法计算人类的疯狂"。
（以下为英文全文）
This really is an eye-opener. According to The New York Times, US President
Joe Biden approved a classified document in March called the “Nuclear
Employment Guidance”. Sources familiar with the situation say that the
strategy laid out in the document emphasises the need for US forces to prepare
for possible coordinated nuclear confrontations with Russia, China and North
Korea.
My first question is this: where is a China-Russia-North Korea alliance, let
alone nuclear alliance? China-Russia relations are close, but Beijing not
having provided any direct military assistance to Moscow in its invasion of
Ukraine suggests their relationship is not an alliance.
Meanwhile, in spite of a decades-old treaty between Beijing and Pyongyang that
calls for mutual military assistance in time of war, China’s military
interactions nowadays with North Korea are perhaps fewer than its interactions
with most African countries. So how could the three countries coordinate these
nuclear strategies or operations against the United States?
The US has no clear advantage in terms of nuclear weapons over Russia, which
has more warheads, and it won’t in the future. Precisely because its
conventional forces have drastically declined since the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, Russia now relies more than ever on nuclear weapons.
This explains why Moscow has made several thinly veiled threats of using
nuclear weapons during its war in Ukraine and will continue to play with
nuclear ambiguity in the decades to come.
China’s nuclear capabilities, including the number of nuclear warheads, are
considered state secrets. Therefore, it is unlikely that anyone in China will
publicly confirm the accuracy of the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute’s estimates. The think tank released a report in June indicating
China’s nuclear arsenal had increased from 410 warheads in January 2023 to 500
this January and that for the first time China could be deploying a small
number of warheads on missiles during peacetime.
In a 2019 defence white paper, China said it would “keep its nuclear
capabilities at the minimum level required for national security”. Evidently
this “minimum level” cannot be quantified because national security needs vary
in different times and environments.
Even if China’s nuclear arsenal has grown to 500 warheads and could grow as
large as 1,500 by 2035, according to Pentagon estimates, Beijing can still
argue that it is still much smaller than Russia’s roughly 6,000 warheads and
the 5,400 of the US. At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had more
than 40,000 nuclear warheads while the US had more than 23,000 – enough to
destroy the whole planet. Why would China choose to become involved in such
madness?
In my understanding, “minimum level” refers to a threshold that no other
nuclear power would dare to cross with a pre-emptive nuclear strike on China,
even if China maintains a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons.
Precisely because of this policy, China has to build adequate strength for
deterrence. It requires China to have sufficient nuclear warheads to resist an
enemy’s first strike and ensure China has second-strike capability.
With such nuclear capabilities, China’s military could have a better chance of
emerging victorious over the US in the event of a conventional war, such as
one in the Taiwan Strait. Given that the gap between the conventional military
forces of China and the US is already closing, China having a large enough
nuclear arsenal would force the US to give up any ideas of using nuclear
weapons first.
China call for a “no first use” policy might look to some people like wishful
thinking at a time when nuclear weapons seem to be growing in importance amid
the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza, but it isn’t. Nuclear weapons are not an
omnipotent force, and having them is no guarantee of success in a conflict. If
China, the US, Russia, Britain and France can all agree that a nuclear war
cannot be won and therefore should never be fought, then why can’t they commit
to their own “no first use” policy?
Much has been written about whether the world has entered a new cold war. If
the US really is poised to resume conducting nuclear tests, as some reports
suggest, this would be tantamount to an official announcement of a new cold
war.
The sight of renewed US nuclear testing would almost certainly usher in tests
by other nuclear powers, spelling doom for nuclear non-proliferation efforts.
This would likely swell the number of states with nuclear weapons beyond the
current nine, resulting in a considerable reduction in the conventional force
superiority of the US and its allies.
Furthermore, if all the world’s nuclear powers increase the readiness of their
nuclear forces, it could increase the chances of false alarms, like those seen
during the Cold War. During the early days of long-range radar, even a rising
moon could be misinterpreted as a missile attack. One can easily conclude that
with more nuclear weapons states on high alert, there could be more false
alarms or significant incidents.
The Biden administration’s nuclear strategy is a shame, not least because the
president spent so much of his political career advocating for nuclear non-
proliferation. We have had no significant wars between global powers for some
80 years since World War II.
If this is a solace, it is also disturbing to think we might enter into
another cold war some 30 years after the first. I can only concur with these
words attributed to Isaac Newton: “I can calculate the movement of the stars,
but not the madness of men.”
预览时标签不可点
微信扫一扫
关注该公众号
****
****
× 分析
： ， ， ， ， ， ， ， ， ， ， ， ， 。 视频 小程序 赞 ，轻点两下取消赞 在看 ，轻点两下取消在看
分享 留言 收藏